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The Public Health Tesseract: Managing the 
Multiplicative Threat 
Asha M. George ∗ 
The public health community tends to manage population 
health issues separately.  For example, we separate 
bioterrorism from antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis from obesity 
from influenza, and so on.  Understandably, this has occurred 
because the requirements for dealing with each of the many 
different public health issues can be complicated and unique.  
To simplify the complexities, we have pulled apart the tangled 
strands of health-related challenges in an effort to identify and 
deal with them individually.  However, we often neglect the 
reality that we have to deal not only with the individual 
strands but with the problems their interactions and the entire 
tangle present, as well.  The threats to public health are 
multiplicative. We must take both measured and 
multidimensional approaches to address them. 
Public health management left the second and third 
dimensions behind long ago and should now be modeled upon 
the four-dimensional tesseract.  The tesseract is based on the 
four-dimensional analog of the cube, with eight cubicle cells, 
twenty-four faces, thirty-two edges, and sixteen vertices 
(Figure 1).1    
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 1. H.S.M. COXETER, REGULAR POLYTOPES 122 (Dover Pub. 1973) (1948). 
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FIGURE 1. TESSERACT 
 
 
Figure 1. Tesseract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With its eight cubicle cells, the tesseract better shapes our 
thinking and actions, and more accurately represents the 
challenges presented by population health issues.  Each of the 
seven individual cells of the tesseract represents an issue that 
is often otherwise inappropriately addressed in isolation.  The 
eighth cell represents the whole tesseract, symbolizing the 
entirety of what must be held in the leader’s mind when 
making decisions.  This four-dimensional construct embodies 
the totality of the problem and its individual parts, thus 
leading to better results. The combined threat of pandemic 
influenza (naturally-occurring) and bioterrorism (human-
generated) can be used to illustrate and support the use of this 
model. 
THE FIRST CELL: ANTICIPATION OF PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA 
Experts consider an influenza pandemic long overdue.2   A 
pandemic could occur via a number of mechanisms, including: 
sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission of avian 
influenza,3  the rise of novel strains of the virus, antigenic shift 
 2. Maggie Fox, Flu Pandemic Could Kill Half Million in US, Reuters, 
June 24, 2005. 
 
 3. See id.; see also Alison Abbott, Chicken Flu Races Through Dutch 
Poultry Farms, 422 NATURE 247 (2003); Andrej Trampuz et al., Avian 
Influenza: A New Pandemic Threat?, 79 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 523, 523-530 
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in the virus,4  genetic reassortment or recombination of human 
influenza with another strain,5  the intentional release of a 
strain known to be extremely virulent in today’s populations or 
genetically engineered to cause a pandemic,6  or the accidental 
release of a strain from a laboratory.7  Given current levels of 
U.S. preparedness and health, an influenza pandemic could 
cause 500,000  to die and more than two million  to become 
severely ill.  Additionally, more than seven million might die 
worldwide.8   Further, it is expected that pandemic influenza 
will affect the entire age spectrum, including young adults.9   
Thus, the first cell of the tesseract addresses the anticipation of 
a pandemic caused by influenza as it relates to preparedness, 
detection, and response requirements. 
THE SECOND CELL: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AS A 
TERRORISM MULTIPLIER 
An enemy could take advantage of the next influenza 
pandemic by applying force-multiplier theory10  (where one 
seeks to multiply the force of an attack by combining effects, 
building upon pre-existing conditions, etc.) in the terrorism 
context.  For example, naturally-occurring or human-generated 
biological or non-biological agents could be released while a 
pandemic is already underway.  Even though it may take 
decades for a pandemic causing influenza virus to occur 
naturally, some cultures may be willing to wait, in order to 
(2004); World Health Organization, Avian Influenza A(H5N1) – Situation 
(Poultry) in Asia as of 2 March 2004: Need for a Long-Term Response, 
Comparison with Previous Outbreaks, 10 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REP. 96, 
96-100 (2004). 
 4. See Nancy J. Cox et al., Influenza Pandemic Planning, 21 VACCINE 
1801, 1801-03 (2003). 
 5. See Robert B. Belshe, The Origins of Pandemic Influenza – Lessons 
from the 1918 Virus, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2209, 2209-11 (2005); see also 
Graeme Laver & Elspeth Garman, Pandemic Influenza: Its Origin and 
Control, 4 MICROBES & INFECTION 1309, 1309-1316 (2002). 
 6. See Kathleen F. Gensheimer et al., Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, 
9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1645, (2003); see also Mohammad Madjid 
et al., Influenza as a Bioweapon, 96 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 345, 345-46 (2003). 
 7. See Walter R. Dowdle, Influenza Pandemic Periodicity, Virus 
Recycling, and the Art of Risk Assessment, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 34, 38 (2006). 
 8. Fox, supra note 2. 
 9. See Eve E. Slater, Industry and Government Perspective in Influenza 
Control, 31 TEX. HEART INST. J. 42, 42-44 (2004) (noting that the 1918 
“Spanish flu” was particularly bad among young adults). 
 10. EDWARD LUTTWAK, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 226 (Harper & 
Row 1991). 
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capitalize on the panic and confusion created by the virus – if 
for no other reason than it would take equally long to 
manufacture an equally dangerous biological threat.  While 
countries throughout the world are focused on the pandemic, 
their infrastructures (including those related to national 
security) would be weakened and strained, making them easy 
targets for successful attacks. 
An enemy could catalyze a pandemic by collocating birds, 
pigs, and humans,11 and by preventing adequate 
communication of health information, including that generated 
by surveillance.12   An enemy could introduce current versions 
of the disease in places where public health infrastructures are 
known to be weak, in order to draw down global medical 
resources.  Furthermore, an enemy could seek to destroy 
stockpiles, manufacturers, distributors, government agencies, 
and laboratories once a pandemic does hit.  As a result, an 
enemy can increase world disorder and prevent countries and 
regions from responding sufficiently to the diseases caused by 
influenza and other organisms.13 
The very threat of a pandemic and the resulting research 
into vaccines and antiviral therapies designed to combat it, 
could benefit potential enemies.14   Research designed to 
develop a vaccine against a pandemic strain could require the 
generation of a more virulent strain that could itself be used as 
a weapon of mass effect.  This would allow an enemy to 
acceptably create increasingly virulent and/or bioengineered 
strains of influenza,15  and develop vaccines and antiviral 
therapies against them, under the supportive eye of the 
worldwide health science establishment.  An enemy would not 
necessarily share this research but if caught could say it was 
trying to validate its results before publishing and otherwise 
releasing its findings.  The vaccine could then be used to 
 11. See Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 352 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1839, 1841-42 (2005). 
 12. See Neil M. Ferguson et al., Public Health Risk from the Avian H5N1 
Influenza Epidemic, 304 SCIENCE 968, 968-69 (2004). 
 13. Anne Applebaum, Op-Ed., Only a Game?, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, 
at A19 (discussing the break-down that occurred from a simulated smallpox 
attack in a simulated war game called Atlantic Storm). 
 14. See Tony DeCrappeo, Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research, 36 NAT’L 
COUNCIL U. RES. ADMIN. NEWSL., July/Aug. 2004, at 2 (noting that new 
security controls on who can work with “select agents” have decreased the 
number of people working on treatments for highly virulent diseases). 
 15. Slater, supra note 9, at 44. 
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protect the enemy population or a subgroup while the disease is 
released and a pandemic ensues. 
Should an enemy decide to incorporate pandemic influenza 
into its plans to wage war or terrorism against other nations, 
information regarding the disease and the state of readiness of 
other countries could easily be gathered.  This information is 
readily available on the Internet.  In addition, an enemy could 
hide behind the nobility of seeking to improve the public health 
of their own nation, region, or even the world, to obtain 
additional information that is not available on the Internet.  It 
would not take much time or research to ascertain the 
pervasive lack of preparedness throughout the world, however.  
This lack is evidenced by the dearth of national pandemic 
preparedness planning;16 mounting difficulties with current-
day influenza vaccine development, production, and 
distribution;17 and increasingly flimsy public health 
infrastructures.18   Even when significant efforts have been 
taken to plan for pandemic influenza (such as the 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza19), activities required to operationalize those plans 
have not occurred pervasively.  This second cell of the tesseract 
addresses the use of a pandemic to multiply the ill-effects of a 
terrorist event as it relates to prevention, preparedness, 
detection, response, and recovery. 
THE THIRD CELL: PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 
Lack of pandemic influenza preparedness plans  is a clear 
indicator of national vulnerability, if only because draft plans 
are not funded or otherwise provided the resources required to 
execute the activities they incorporate.  Parts of a draft plan 
could certainly be adopted for use if a pandemic were to occur 
before the plan was finalized.  However, this necessarily 
renders disease prevention and preparedness secondary.  An 
enemy can accurately assume that if a plan is still in draft, 
then the authoring country faced with a pandemic will only 
respond to a pandemic if it occurs, and will not be truly 
prepared for it ahead of time.  Therefore, that country is 
vulnerable to the disease as well as the approaching 
 16. See generally Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1839-42. 
 17. Applebaum, supra note 13. 
 18. Trampuz, supra note 3, at 523-27. 
 19. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006). 
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pandemic.20  Compounding the problem, many nations are 
waiting for industrialized countries to complete their planning 
so they can see what works before developing and 
implementing their own plans.  This third cell of the tesseract 
addresses planning as an indicator of national vulnerability as 
it relates to preparedness, response, and recovery. 
THE FOURTH CELL: VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 
Vaccine manufacturers have faced increasing difficulties 
with current influenza vaccine development.21   Such 
difficulties are not surprising.  The same basic egg-based 
procedures have been used to develop these vaccines for 
decades.  While these methods have been improved upon, it 
still takes months to develop a new vaccine, regardless of how 
well it actually prevents disease once produced an
Further, we still guess about which components for new 
strains of the influenza virus will combine in the future.  
Although this speculation is certainly informed, there is no 
reason to expect that it will always be correct or that the 
predictions will hit the mark completely.23   Should they turn 
out to be incorrect, vaccines for the correct strain would need to 
be developed after the expression of the virus, further delaying 
delivery to populations throughout the world.24  Lastly, as with 
vaccines for organisms that could be used for bioterrorism, 
vaccine manufacturing companies find influenza vaccine 
development to be a difficult business enterprise.  Without an 
outbreak of the disease to increase the demand for vaccine, it is 
hard to make an effective business case for engaging in 
development of a new vaccine. This becomes harder as time 
goes by and vaccines fail to be produced.25  Possible solutions 
include government-run programs that encourage companies to 
develop vaccines by providing grants.26   However, participation 
 20. World Health Organization, supra note 3, at 98-99. 
 21. Applebaum, supra note 13. 
 22. Erica Seiguer, Protecting the Nation’s Health: Ensuring a Stable 
Supply of Influenza Vaccine, COMMONWEALTH FUND, July 2005, at 1. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Slater, supra note 9, at 43 (noting that under optimal conditions, 
it will take nine to twelve months to prepare adequate vaccine to fight a 
pandemic); see also Trampuz, supra note 3, at 528-29. 
 25. See David Brown, How US Got Down to Two Makers of Flu Vaccine, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A01 (stating that even under the best 
circumstances, vaccines have never been very attractive investments). 
 26. See id. 
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in such grant programs is not lucrative.  Some money being 
better than none is not particularly motivational in the 
business context.  Thus, this fourth cell of the tesseract 
addresses vaccine development issues as they relate to disease 
prevention. 
THE FIFTH CELL: PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE 
Public health infrastructures throughout the world have 
experienced erosion and decline for decades.  Prevention and 
preparedness are often sacrificed in efforts to contain health 
care costs or to pay for other health programs that address 
more urgent real-time needs.27   Countries make public health 
reinvestments sporadically, often after a disease thought to be 
close to eradication reappears and/or has mutated into 
something worse (for example, those diseases caused by 
antibiotic resistant organisms, such as tuberculosis).28  
Although many consider the public health infrastructures of 
third world countries to be inadequate, such countries may very 
well find themselves in better stead when it comes to dealing 
with pandemic influenza because they focus many of their 
public health efforts on combating epidemics from other 
diseases on an ongoing basis.29   However, localized disease 
outbreaks could overwhelm any country’s public health 
infrastructure,30  and pandemic influenza could overwhelm the 
public health infrastructure in every country around the world.  
This fifth cell of the tesseract addresses public health 
infrastructure as it relates to disease prevention, deterrence, 
preparedness, detection, response, recovery, and mitigation. 
 27. See COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH DIV. OF 
HEALTH CARE SERVS INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 70, 
(National Academy Press 1997) (1988) (noting that new health concerns such 
as AIDS, Alzheimer’s disease, alcoholism, and others). 
 28. See Andrew C. Hayward & Richard J. Coker, Could a Tuberculosis 
Epidemic Occur in London as it did in New York?,  6 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 12, 15 (2000) (stating that London needs to learn from the New York 
tuberculosis epidemic and take prompt action to improve control by developing 
solutions based on the local epidemiology of the disease). 
 29. See WORLD MED. ASS’N, WMA DECLARATION OF WASHINGTON ON 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm (discussing how health systems 
worldwide are currently struggling to meet the demands created by resistant 
organisms, civil strife, unclean urban environments, and aging populations). 
 30. See id. 
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THE SIXTH CELL: INFORMATION COLLECTION 
PRIORITIES 
Countries can identify potential enemies (who may use 
easily available information regarding pandemic influenza to 
attack others) by tracking what sort of information is being 
generated and collected, and by whom.  For example, influenza 
vaccine and antiviral research and development, such as that 
regarding cell-culture-based vaccines31 can be monitored.32  
Having identified these research and development programs, 
contributions to the scientific body of knowledge regarding 
influenza can also be monitored at conferences and in journals.  
The difference between what is discussed regarding influenza 
and what is produced regarding other diseases could be 
obvious. 
Information gathered through surveillance mechanisms 
regarding the rates of influenza already occurring in various 
parts of the world can also be evaluated for anomalies relative 
to the rates within individual countries and regions.33   If rates 
suddenly decline and stay low as compared to other areas, yet 
no explanations have been published or otherwise articulated, 
these rates could be indicators of the development of a 
successful vaccine that protects the enemy’s population better 
than that of other countries.34 
Furthermore, we must be prepared to deal with the impact 
and aftermath of a pandemic for up to two years.35  A pandemic 
would interrupt normal social processes, including: 
communication, transportation, and diplomacy, diminishing 
and/or possibly destroying cultures.36   Social disorder, chaos, 
 31. See Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1840; Slater, supra note 9, at 43. 
 32. Cf. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 968 (stating that the World Health 
Organization Global Influenza Network’s major focus is to compile information 
for influenza vaccine formulation, based on the analysis of viral isolates). 
 33. Id. at 968 (presenting a method to detect increases in viral 
transmissibility based on examination of clusters of human cases). Cf. Johan 
Walden & Edward H. Kaplan, Estimating Time and Size of Bioterror Attack, 
10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1202, 1202–04 (2004) (discussing a 
method for determining the number of people who will be symptomatic and 
require medical attention after the attack). 
 34. Cf. Walden & Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1202 (discussing how an 
outbreak forecast could assist in determining the response effort required). 
 35. See Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1840. 
 36. See Danuta Skowronski, The High Impact of an Influenza Pandemic, 
170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 768, 768 (2004) (describing the estimated number of 
Canadians who would be affected by a pandemic of influenza). 
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and anarchy could ensue, resulting in reduced security 
throughout the United States and the world.  The need for 
information will increase, but the ability of organizations to 
collect and analyze that information will be curtailed.37   How 
will the United States distribute medications and deliver 
medical aid to stranded personnel worldwide?  How will 
information continue to be collected and sent back to the 
United States in this context?  What is the plan for dealing 
with the perception that Americans have access to medication 
(just because they are American) that they are not sharing?  
How will our embassies, consulates, and other offices be 
protected if our security forces are depleted?  All of these 
questions relate directly to the health of the groups of people 
involved.  Therefore, it is the shared responsibility of the public 
health and intelligence communities (as well as the broader 
government, military, and public) to answer these questions. 
There is also a growing need to fill the information and 
intelligence void when it comes to disease.  There is much more 
to health-related intelligence than the science of identification, 
determining the impact of disease on foreign dignitaries, and 
tracking disease patterns.38   It is important to understand how 
a country or region handles disease, as well as how the sick are 
viewed (and in a pandemic, how they are treated – ostracized 
and possibly mishandled).  The comprehensiveness of extant 
infrastructures needs to be quantified and judged by evaluating 
the level of medical science and technology, how well 
indications are identified, how early warning is provided, and 
whether medical facilities are present, functioning, and well-
equipped, to name a few examples.39   Additionally, there are 
real differences between countries, particularly in how they 
handle or wish to handle issues such as quarantine.40  
 37. Cf. DENIS C. KAUFMAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MEDICAL 
INTELLIGENCE: A THEATER ENGAGEMENT TOOL, 22–24 (2001) (stating that 
there are not enough medical intelligence analysts). 
 38. See id. at 1–3 (“Medical intelligence, which informs the preventative 
medicine process, identifies medical threats to U.S. forces, but also assesses 
medical trends, organizations, and related events that affect foreign 
populations, and that may impact—directly or indirectly—U.S. policies and 
interests.”). 
 39. See id. at 9–11. 
 40. Mary Ann Benitez, Hong Kong’s Health Policies Focus on Containing 
Avian Influenza,  361 LANCET 318, 318 (2003) (stating that Hong Kong’s 
strategy includes active surveillance and improved hygiene in markets and on 
farms); Caroline Brown, et. al., Avian Influenza: Current Situation in 
Southeast Asia and Impact on Europe, 10 EUROSURVEILLANCE WEEKLY, Jan. 
20, 2005, at 1, 1-10, http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2005/050120.asp  
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Prioritization and diversion of limited resources will come into 
play in ways unique to each country.  This broad spectrum of 
issues cannot be fully addressed by the intelligence or 
diplomatic communities alone.41   Most members of these 
communities do not possess the understanding of public health 
necessary to comprehend and apply the information gathered.  
This sixth cell of the tesseract addresses health-related 
intelligence collection requirements as they relate to 
prevention, preparedness, and attribution. 
THE SEVENTH CELL: INFORMATION ANALYSIS 
Considering the lack of attention and priority the U.S. 
public health community garners, it would be absurd to 
delegate the entirety of this information analysis requirement 
to public health professionals while the intelligence and other 
communities focus their efforts elsewhere, and vice versa.  
However, the public health community is the only community 
in a position to combine information from various sources in 
order to correctly and comprehensively identify the varied 
implications of disease.  Years have gone by while various 
organizations, agencies, and countries have discussed the 
implications of naturally-occurring and human-generated 
disease.  We need to realize now that there is no other 
professional community capable of filling this gap.  This 
seventh cell of the tesseract addresses information analysis 
requirements as they relate to prevention, preparedness, 
detection, response, attribution, and mitigation. 
THE EIGHTH CELL: MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The eighth cell of the tesseract is the composite – the entire 
grouping of the seven cells.  It best represents the mind of the 
decision maker as it should be, thinking about different but 
significant aspects of individually important and related public 
health issues and problems. 
(noting that the Vietnamese government attempts to control outbreaks by 
culling infected birds, preventing transport of poultry to and from infected 
areas, controlling the slaughter and transport of poultry, and temporarily 
stopping imports of fowl and fowl products from neighboring countries); 
Trampuz, supra note 3, at 528-29 (stating that isolation precautions identical 
to those recommended for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome should be 
implemented and continued for fourteen days). 
 41. See Applebaum, supra note 13 (stating that security efforts should 
also focus on fixing the health care system and sharing vaccines). 
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CONCLUSION 
As public health professionals, we must entertain the 
notion of a tesseract to broaden our thinking and manage the 
complex interactions between and among the eight cubicle 
cells, sixteen vertices, twenty-four faces, and thirty-two edges.  
This is not a case of making way for the public health 
community to take a leadership role in dealing with various 
threats.  The community is already there, and by mission and 
for professional and organizational survival, it must use the 
assets, resources, organizational acumen, analyses, and 
operational expertise that it possesses beyond all others to deal 
with the threat.  Using the tesseract will enable us to respond 
to the threat successfully, by applying our skills broadly, and 
addressing the issues and their interactions comprehensively.  
Managing the multiplicative threat is our mission and our 
calling. 
